This book has an intriguing thesis: that Titoism is Stalinism, Yugoslavia's version of "Socialism in One Country." The point is one which many Western scholars and statesmen miss, writes Banac. Because their focus has been so riveted on East-West tensions, they have mistakenly portrayed Yugoslav socialism as it developed after the 1948 rift with Moscow in simplistic terms. Here, with Yugoslavia, they believed, was a socialism that was genuinely building democracy and a pluralistic society, while coincidentally also challenging Stalin's hegemony in the Communist world. This was , of course, music to the ears of the ideological West, living in the crusading era of the Cold War. The West wanted to view Yugoslavia as united, standing behind Tito in opposition to Moscow. It bestowed its approval with financial aid already in the early fifties.
But life and politics are not simple , and especially not in Yugoslavia. Social and political alliances can be strangely illogical and unpredictable in this Southeast European state. The shifting alignments can be confusing, as Banac illustrates in charts which plot political regroupings within the party beginning in the early twenties. One thing, however, is certain: that Communists in Yugoslavia were not wholely united behind Tito against Stalin in 1948; in fact, Banac demonstrates that opposition to Tito was substantial. Yet, pro-Cominformist (i.e., pro-Moscow) support in Yugoslavia was diverse, scattered, unorganized. Supporters' motives varied: from the ideological, to the tribal, to the nationalist. Moreover, alliances continued to shift, which enabled Tito's "Stalinism" to prevail. In the years of the Cominform crisis, Tito and his aides, many of whom had been trained in Moscow in the thirties -according to Banac it took someone who studied under Stalin to be a Stalinist-were able to whip Socialist Yugoslavia into shape. Some of the pro-Moscow opposition went into exile, others were rounded up, prosecuted, and sent to Goli otok (Yugoslavia's gulag). Statistical tables document the surprisingly large numbers. In the end Tito's anti-Communist fight achieved what neither inter-war party confrontations or the wartime struggle could, and what Stalinist purges of the thirties did achieve for Stalin:
namely, absolute control of the party and of the state. Democracy and pluralism were merely in the eyes of the Western anti-Soviet beholders.
Unlike many English-language works on post-World War II Yugoslavia, Banac's pays considerable attention to the Slovenes, those within the republic and also Triestine and Carinthian Slovenes. The focus, of course, remains on Slovene Communists. Banac v touches upon the Dolomite Declaration, the Crnomelj events which in February 1944 created a legislative body out of the Slovene liberation movement, and the Dachau Trials of 1948-49, which are covered in some detail. Banac concludes that the negligible number of Cominformists in Slovenia proper (fewer than in any of the other republics) was due to the belief that Slovene "aspirations could best be served within the tightly knit federal structure championed by Tito," (189). In other words , Cominformism was viewed as being in conflict with Slovene patriotism.
Ivo Banac teaches at Yale University and has won the Wayne Vucinich Prize of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies for his book The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (1984) . The volume under review here is the result of a project the author began nearly twenty years ago, using documents then available at the Hoover Institute. Returning to the project from time to time, he supplemented his research with interviews with emigres, and also with American authorities of the postwar occupied territories of Trieste and occupied Carinthia. He has also made extensive use of Vladimir Dedijer' s documentary opus, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Brow Tito, three hefty volumes which have been published since 1980. Banac's With Stalin Against Tito is absorbing reading for its attempt at an investigation of the internal workings of Yugoslav Communist politics. It is a welcome beginning towards a new analysis of the subject. The work should also perk the attention of those who would claim to understand International Communism, especially in the immediate post-1945 era. One fascinating suggestion is that it was Tito's militancy in the mid-forties, not that of Stalin who was then apparently trying to get along with the West, that was responsible for the beginning of the Cold War. All in all this book is provocative reading.
Carole Rogel, The Ohio State University. . Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 1987. 175 pp., photographs.
Irena Gantar Godina, T.G. Masaryk in masarykovstvo na Slovenskem
Godina's purpose in writing this book is to examine the impact of Masaryk and his philosophy on Slovenes in the last two decades before World War 1. Those Slovenes who came to be called Masarykites or Realists (after the name for the political party that Masaryk organized) had usually studied in Prague at Charles University's Czech branch. Some had direct contacts with Masaryk, many of them even studied philosophy. While in Prague, others learned of the esteemed Czech professor from Croats and Serbs, whose number at that university were far greater than the Slovenes. The Croat Stjepan Radic and the Serb Svetozar Pribicevic, future leaders in inter-war Yugoslavia were among those who belonged to a South Slav Masaryk circle.
The heart of the author's study is contained in three major chapters of the book which deal with, first, Slovene Realists in general; then Realists who joined the JSDS (Yugoslav Social Democratic Party); and finally the National Radical Youth (NRD). Evolution of the thought and activities of prominent individuals within these groups, scant sources permit-
